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[ F A C U LT Y ]
N E W S  &  R E S E A R C H
- S C H O L A R ’ S  F O R U M -
what factors enable states to manage their conflicts
offers valuable insights for new tax cooperation.
Governments rely heavily on taxes to fund their oper-
ations. If business transactions subject to tax are entirely
domestic, a country wields considerable power to imple-
ment a tax system and collect the designated taxes. But,
if the transactions cross national borders, who taxes
them? And, perhaps most important, what happens
when countries disagree? The international tax literature
has devoted tremendous resources to considering sub-
stantive issues in international taxation. Little attention,
however, has been directed to how conflict is handled—
essentially the “relations” aspect of international tax. 
Yet resolution of tax conflict is crucial to the growth
of international commerce. Consider what would hap-
pen if Corporation A from Country A set up a sales
office in Country B and sold widgets, earning $1 million
in profit; both countries would likely tax the $1 million.
Unless the two countries establish a mechanism for pri-
oritizing which country gets to tax the $1 million, the
result could be double taxation. If both countries had a
50 percent tax rate, double taxation would not simply
discourage cross-border business, it would eliminate the
profit because Corporation A would pay half a million
in taxes to both Country A and Country B. How might
Country A and Country B arrive at a plan to coordinate
their taxation? What factors could improve the likeli-
hood of their reaching agreement?
Cross-border conflict is not confined to taxation; vir-
tually all social and commercial behavior can generate
international disagreement. The international relations
field extensively studies interactions among nations—
and regime theory specifically examines how and under
what circumstances agreement (i.e., a regime) can be
reached internationally. Although the analyses in inter-
national relations rarely use taxation as a case study, we
can bridge that gap from the tax side by exploring the
application of regime theory to case studies from inter-
national tax.
A New View of Global Tax 
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Nations have always been especially protective of their right to levy taxes andcollect revenue. Not surprisingly, tax conflicts erupt between nations andfailure to resolve these disagreements can be costly to states and to taxpayers.However, recent research focusing on why taxing powers are important and
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est rival. Meanwhile, Mittal’s legal team
argued vigorously, but ultimately unsuc-
cessfully, that the post-transaction US
market was sufficiently competitive with-
out divestiture. The last thorns of the
deal’s North American component were
still plenty sharp. The DOJ filed a com-
plaint in federal court that same month to
enforce Mittal’s May agreement to divest
Dofasco. 
Both the DOJ and TK, the German cor-
poration that had been promised Dofas-
co, its long-lost target, urged Mittal to try
to dissolve the Stichting trust. In October,
Mittal formally sought the trust’s dissolu-
tion, but Stichting’s independent board re-
fused. In December, TK sued Mittal in The
Netherlands to enforce its contract to buy
Dofasco. “In a way, they did us a favor,”
notes Leddy. The cause of action provid-
ed Mittal a means to resolve the issue of
whether the Stichting trust could be dis-
solved. The court ruled for Mittal in Jan-
uary 2007, agreeing that Mittal had ex-
hausted all reasonable avenues to fulfill its
eleven-month-old contractual promise to
sell Dofasco to TK. In effect, this meant
the DOJ’s regulatory remedy resided be-
hind Door No. 2. 
In February of 2007, the DOJ selected
Maryland’s Sparrows Point steel plant for
divestiture as an alternative to Dofasco (at
press time, the Stichting trust still con-
trolled Dofasco’s shares) to resolve US
market antitrust implications of the
ArcelorMittal merger. A May hearing in
US District Court in Washington cleared
the way for Mittal’s sale of Sparrows
Point. In August, Mittal agreed to divert
Sparrows Point to an international con-
sortium of three companies led by Esmark,
a Chicago-based US steel distributor, but
the deal collapsed in December when the
companies failed to secure financing. Iron-
ically, after another auction process, an
agreement was reached to divest Sparrows
Point to none other than Severstal, the
Russian steel company that Arcelor share-
holders had rebuffed in June. That deal
closed at the end of March 2008.
Finally, two years, one month and
twenty-four days after Mittal’s surprise
bid for Arcelor, the case was officially
closed. Though it’s somewhat counterin-
tuitive, Leddy confides that the euphoria
of closing a deal—even an acquisition like
ArcelorMittal—is powerful, but not as
satisfying as watching the byproduct
thrive. 
“What’s rewarding is when you talk to
the client months later and they report that
the transaction is a success and that inte-
gration went smoothly,” says Leddy.
“When they tell you that the deal was
worth all of the effort, that is what’s truly
satisfying.”
Chad Konecky is a freelance writer and a
program manager for ESPN. His last arti-
cle for BC Law Magazine was “Defending
Moussaoui,” in the Fall/Winter 2006 issue.
ed Arcelor the running room it needed to
elude acquisition. The Mittal legal team’s
“pocket” decree arrangement acted like a
surgical bypass, allowing the life’s blood
of the deal to flow unabated.
This cross-continental and cross-cul-
tural variance in required tactics is a high
hurdle in the globalization of antitrust law.
“A major challenge in transactions like
this, especially hostile ones, is under-
standing the strategic business motiva-
tions of the affected parties, the markets
you’re dealing with, the procedural and
substantive antitrust issues in multiple ju-
risdictions, and, of course, all the relevant
takeover rules,” says Leddy. “Then, you
must craft a coherent strategy and find cre-
ative solutions to very difficult, multi-di-
mensional problems. It requires sustained
intensity.”
Back on the Continent, Arcelor fought
back. The company called a meeting to se-
cure shareholder permission to buy back
20 percent of its stock. The end game? A
deal with investor Alexey Mordashov, an
89-percent shareholder in Russia’s OAO
Severstal steel company, who would ex-
change $16.6 billion in cash and assets for
a 38-percent stake in Arcelor, if the stock-
holder buyback succeeded. The merger
would have created a steelmaker with a
market valuation of $40 billion, more than
twice the size of Mittal.
At that moment, attorneys on both
sides of the transaction—folks practically
living in their offices across the globe for
months—surely cranked into overdrive.
As Arcelor zigged, Mittal zagged, raising
its original offer by 20 percent, to just un-
der $26 billion, including a sweeter pot for
Arcelor shareholders. Once the Severstal
deal was officially proposed, Mittal lever-
aged a wavering Arcelor shareholder base
by persuading 20 percent of shareholders to
sign a letter opposing the buyback and the
accompanying minority-investor scenario,
with Mordashov serving as the white squire.
Gutted from the inside, Arcelor canceled the
shareholder vote and, eight days later, ca-
pitulated by signing a memorandum of un-
derstanding with Mittal. 
But after 149 days in play, the deal was
far from done.
In August 2006, Mittal closed its ten-
der offer for Arcelor; the final per-share
price was nearly double Arcelor’s pre-bid
peak. Even with ArcelorMittal’s European
Union-mandated divestiture of steel mills
in Germany, Italy, and Poland, the deal
created a steelmaking behemoth with a
production rate three times that of its clos-
Current regime theory literature falls into
four rough categories: (1) neorealist-based
regime theories (power is the dominant fac-
tor in regime formation because states
exert power to design and use a regime to
achieve their own goals); (2) neoliberal-
ist-based regime theories (regimes form
because there is a market failure that pre-
vents states from reaching a Pareto-opti-
mal outcome and the regime reduces
transactions costs and facilitates a Pareto-
optimal result); (3) cognitivist-based
regime theories (a state’s “interests and
goals” are not a given but instead are
shaped by outside forces and actors,
including experts); and (4) a synthesis
approach to regime theory (the regime
theories are not exclusive and competitive
but rather reflect the fact that regimes
may develop for different reasons
depending on whether power, market
failure, or expert communities play a
more influential role in a particular sub-
set of cases). 
What do the perspectives and insights of
regime theory add to our understanding of
the most widely known example of inter-
national tax negotiations: the development
of a system to relieve double taxation
(experienced by Corporation A in the
hypothetical)? This system of relief,
embodied in the network of bilateral and
model tax treaties established over the past
eighty years, clearly constitutes a regime:
the principle is that international double
taxation of income is harmful and should
be avoided; the norm is that residence
countries should yield primary tax jurisdic-
tion to the source country; and the rules
include the details coordinating the inter-
section of two countries’ tax laws. Accept-
ing the assertion that there is indeed a
regime governing double taxation, and that
the regime comprises the bilateral tax
treaties, the model tax treaties, and the
related efforts to avoid double taxation of
income, is it possible to understand how it
Scholar’s Forum
(continued from page 30)
53SPRING /  SUMMER 2008  | BC LAW MAGAZINE
formed and to contemplate when interna-
tional tax regimes will be successful?
The first step is to discern whether the
double tax regime is driven by power (neo-
realist tradition) or whether it represents a
case of market failure (neoliberal tradi-
tion), that is, whether the resulting regime
is a product of the exercise of power by one
state, or a product of several states over-
coming informational barriers to reach
mutually desirable outcomes. 
Using a series of models involving
developed and developing countries, sev-
eral conclusions emerge. Of the two dom-
inant models of regime formation, the
neoliberalist more accurately reflects the
experience of the double taxation regime.
Although the neorealist focus on power
(including economic power) may be useful
in explaining some elements of treaty
negotiations, the neoliberalist model
(which looks beyond power to the impact
of game theory, issue type, and related fac-
tors) offers a more comprehensive under-
standing of the regime formation process.
For example, it helps explain why coun-
tries negotiate treaties despite the avail-
ability of a unilateral solution, and why
some countries pursue treaties and other
do not. The game theory aspect of neolib-
eralism identifies the double taxation
regime as a coordination game where the
primary challenge concerns the distribu-
tive effects. The greater the distributional
component, the more difficult it is to
reach consensus. Thus, where two negoti-
ating countries are both developed coun-
tries with similar investment flows, fewer
distributional issues should arise. If one
country is developed and the other is
developing, then the selection of regime
rules will carry distributional conse-
quences that will impede agreement. 
Following the initial step of determining
which regime model captures the double tax-
ation example, research should also explore:
(1) whether market failure (i.e., neoliberalist
regime theory) generally characterizes
regime formation in tax; (2) how game theo-
ry can refine our assessment of market fail-
ure in tax; (3) how the regime participants’
relative positions of economic power and
resources affect tax regimes; and (4) the role
of expert communities in structuring and
facilitating the creation of tax regimes. 
At the end of the day, the value of
regime theory to international tax resides
not in a precise predictive power, but
rather in creating a framework that shapes
critical thinking about international tax
questions. Despite the complicated and
unresolved nature of regime theory, the
coherence and organization it brings to
international tax will discipline our inves-
tigations into international agreements
and will encourage tax scholars to appreci-
ate international tax relations as part of a
broader system of international relations.
——————————————————
This column is based on the article “Inter-
national Tax Relations: Theory and Impli-
cations,” which was published in 60 Tax L.
Rev. 83 (2007).
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Then, by one act of judicial alchemy, nearly
3,000 people of different races, languages,
creeds, and social background become one
with the People from whom the judiciary
derives its power. 
After congratulating us, Judge Bowler
emphasizes two of our new rights and
responsibilities: voting, and jury service.
She tells the story of a woman who served
on the jury in a case Judge Bowler was try-
ing, although it meant working nights and
considerable personal inconvenience. She
would willingly have excused the woman,
but the Haitian-born juror explained that
Judge Bowler had presided over the cere-
mony that had made her an American citi-
zen, and that she wanted to show that she
took her responsibilities seriously.
We too intend to take our new duties
seriously, and to do what we can to safe-
guard the luminous protections and free-
doms set out in Pass the US Citizenship
Exam, even while the actions of an arro-
gant administration and pliable Congress
daily threaten their eclipse in this nation
where we have made our home. 
But first we need lunch.
Jane Whitehead is a frequent contributor
to BC Law Magazine.
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